U.S. District Court holds that settlement of shareholder claim for unfair stock redistribution is not an insured loss

In Genzyme v. Federal Ins. Co., 2009 WL 3101025 (D. Mass.) Judge Gertner held that a settlement of a claim of unfair stock redistribution is not an insurable loss pursuant to the commonly understood meaning of the word "loss" or under public policy.

The underlying plaintiffs alleged that Genzyme's directors and officers conspired to benefit holders of one type of Genzyme stock at the expense of holders of another type of Genzyme stock. Genzyme agreed to settle the claim by making a payment of $64 million to the plaintiff class, owners of the disadvantaged stock. Genzyme then sought reimbursement from a Directors and Officers ("D & O") insurance policy. Judge Gertner held that the payment was not a "loss" covered by the policy:

Genzyme may not have benefitted in the Share Exchange, but the existing General Division's shareholders surely did. And the Settlement Payment was meant to redress that imbalance. The question then is: When a corporation pays a settlement to resolve a claim that it benefitted one group of shareholders at the expense of another group of shareholders, is this settlement payment an insurable loss? The answer to this question must undoubtedly be "no."

Judge Gertner explained this answer with an analogy to dividing a milkshake between two sons, apparently a reference to the movie There Will Be Blood. While I'm sure her analogy would make sense if I pondered it, or perhaps watched the movie during my copious free time, luckily she also wrote plainly:

Genzyme should not be able to divide the benefits of equity ownership among its shareholders one way, redistribute those benefits, and then demand indemnification from its insurer for the redivision. If Genzyme's interpretation of the Settlement Payment as a "loss" were correct, one could imagine how insured companies could transform insurance policies into profit centers for their businesses. A corporation merely need issue several classes of shares, cancel one class of shares in an arguably unfair way, and then demand that its insurer pick up the tab for the resulting judgment or settlement. The shareholders whose shares were "cancelled" would be compensated through judgment or settlement, and the corporation's other shareholders would obtain the benefits flowing from the share cancellation while shifting a portion of its costs to the corporation's insurer. Everyone would win, except for the insurance company forced to bear the loss of paying off the disgruntled shareholders.

U.S. District court holds that there is no coverage to indemnify officers and directors where there is no coverage elsewhere in the policy

In my last few posts I've been discussing Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 3101025.

The court held that, because there was no coverage elsewhere in the policy, there was also no coverage under a clause covering all loss for which the insured granted indemnification to its officers and directors. The ruling was based on the public policy that allowing coverage in such circumstances would lead to fraud and chicanery:

[I]t makes little sense to allow a corporation to sidestep coverage limitations in its insurance policy through the simple expedient of claiming that a settlement payment was made to indemnify its directors and officers. Since a corporation can only act through its corporate agents, it will often be the case that when a shareholder can bring a claim against the corporation, she can also bring one against its directors and officers. As the court concluded in the New York case of Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 188 A.D.2d 47, 54, 594 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y.App.Div.1993), the approach supported by Genzyme would encourage fraud by insured corporations:

Under the construction urged by [the insured corporation and its officer], if an officer or director was sued together with the corporation, the corporation could make full or partial restitution of the embezzled or fraudulently obtained funds purportedly on behalf of its officer, adopt a resolution indemnifying the officer, and then successfully make claim against its D & O insurer for the full amount of the settlement.

The Court refuses to construe the Executive Protection Policy in a manner that would encourage such chicanery.

First Circuit holds that company is entitled to coverage for claim against its directors and officers for unfair stock redistribution

About a year ago I wrote several posts about Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 657 F.Supp.2d 282 (D. Mass. 2009) , a case concerning coverage for settlement of a shareholder claim for unfair stock redistribution. Judge Gertner of the U.S. District Court held that there was no coverage.

In Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 3991739, the First Circuit has reversed in part, and remanded. It disagreed with Judge Gertner's conclusion that coverage for the loss is barred as a matter of public policy. It also held that while the policy's "Bump-Up" clause does not cover the amount paid by the corporation to settle the claims against it, the policy does cover any settlement amounts paid under an indemnification obligation with respect to the directors and officers. Because a portion of the claim may have been paid to settle claims against directors and officers, the First Circuit remanded the case to the District Court to consider the question of allocation.

U.S. District Court discusses meaning of "purchase"

In my last couple of posts I have been discussing Genzyme v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 3101025 (D. Mass.).

The court held that a separate, sufficient ground to find no coverage for the stock-trade transaction was a "bump-up provision" of the policy, which stated that the insurer would not be liable for a loss "based upon, arising from, or in consequence of the actual or proposed payment by any Insured Organization of allegedly inadequate . . . consideration in connection with its purchased of securities issued by any Insured Organization." (Italics added.)

The insured admitted that it gave one class of shares, which are the equivalent of money, to holders of another class of shares in exchange for their relinquishment of those shares. The insured argued that it did not obtain anything in return. The court disagreed, holding that the insured "acquired an intangible right that it did not possess before - the right to cancel the outstanding Biosurgery Division tracking stock shares, which Genzyme wanted to do in order to reorganize its capital structure." The court held that the share exchange was "unambiguously a 'purchase' within the natural and ordinary meaning of the word."

Why thieves can't get insurance

In my last post I discussed Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 3101025 (D. Mass.).

In that decision Judge Gertner included an interesting discussion of a fundamental tenet of insurance law: a "loss" does not include restoration of an ill-gotten gain.

A thief should not be able to claim the return of stolen property as an insurable loss. Similarly, an individual who breaches her contract and then is forced to pay damages should not be able to seek indemnification under an insurance policy. [This is an overstatement; there are circumstances when insurance covers damages flowing from a breach of contract.] If I pay only $100 for an item for which I promised to pay $200, and I am later ordered by a court to pay the additional $100, I should not be able to claim the additional $100 as an insurable loss. Had I paid the full $200 due up front, then clearly no part of the $200 would constitute loss covered by insurance. The dilatory nature of my obligatory payment should not transform it into an insurable event.