The tragic case of a girl in foster care who at age 11 was beaten nearly to death by her aunt and stepfather has been periodic front page news for years. The abuse put the child into a coma in 2005. Over the opposition of her stepfather, who purportedly sought to avoid a murder conviction, the Department of Social Services brought suit to allow her doctors to terminate life support, as she was in a vegetative state from which there appeared to be no hope of recovery. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled in favor of DSS. The child, however, began to breathe on her own and eventually recovered to the point that she could talk. The aunt committed suicide and the stepfather is in jail.
And now we move on to the insurance issues.
The child's current guardian sued a clinic that provided therapy to the child when some of the abuse took place. The defendant's insurer, Valley Forge Insurance Company, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its policy does not cover the allegations.
The policy contained an exclusion for the "actual or threatened sexual or physical abuse or molestation by anyone to any person while in the care, custody or control of the insured."
At issue is the meaning of "in the care of." The insureds argued that the phrase means "physically in the care."
In Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. The Carson Center for Human Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 884802 (2011) the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts disagreed. Finding little case law on point, the court turned to the dictionary definition of "care" to find that physical proximity is not required. Rather, the phrase means "under the supervision or charge of the insured."
The court held that the provision of bi-weekly therapy was sufficient to meet this definition.
The court also noted that in the underlying complaint the child's guardian alleged that she was in the care of the insured. "The word cannot carry one meaning for the purposes of liability and a different one for the purposes of coverage."
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Monday, March 14, 2011
Republicans in Congress working on flood insurance
I write periodically about the imminent expiration/actual expiration/retroactive extension of the National Flood Insurance Program, or NFIP. NFIP is a program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") that issues standard flood insurance policies, mostly through private insurers. NFIP is created by statute, and was originally set to expire in October, 2008. Congress has issued several short-term extensions to it.
Even though there is now a whopping six months until NFIP expires again, this time round, according to this article in Insurance Journal, one side of the aisle is already working on the issue. The Republican draft of legislation will phase out subsidies (and therefore the entire program; the whole point of NFIP is to provide subsidies).
Even though there is now a whopping six months until NFIP expires again, this time round, according to this article in Insurance Journal, one side of the aisle is already working on the issue. The Republican draft of legislation will phase out subsidies (and therefore the entire program; the whole point of NFIP is to provide subsidies).
Thursday, March 10, 2011
Coming soon: dog exclusions
According to this article in Claimsjournal.com, the American Association of Insurance Services (AAIS), which develops policy forms, has drafted endorsements for homeowners and umbrella policies which exclude coverage for damages caused by dogs owned by the policyholders.
Given the range of lawsuits that are brought against dog owners (I recall a case in which a dog barked from an enclosed lawn, startling the plaintiff and making her fall) and the high damages that can be awarded in dog bite cases, I recommend that dog owners avoid these endorsements even if it means paying higher premiums.
Given the range of lawsuits that are brought against dog owners (I recall a case in which a dog barked from an enclosed lawn, startling the plaintiff and making her fall) and the high damages that can be awarded in dog bite cases, I recommend that dog owners avoid these endorsements even if it means paying higher premiums.
Tuesday, March 8, 2011
Appeals Court holds that judicial estoppel doctrine bars assignment of some claims to prevailing plaintiff
Stephen Hanlon sued Becky Sandman for injuring him when she was driving while intoxicated.
At trial Hanlon received a judgment of approximately $17 million.
Hanlon, as the assignee of Sandman's rights, then sued Sandman's insurer, Homeland, for breach of its duty to defend and breach of Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 93A and 176D. He alleged that the insurer and the insurance defense attorney failed to adequately prepare for and defend at trial, exposing Sandman to an excess judgment; and that they failed to explore settlement opportunities and convey them to Sandman.
Hanlon later substituted Sandman as the plaintiff. Homeland moved to dismiss on the basis of judicial estoppel. That motion was allowed, on the ground that Hanlon was the real party in interest regardless of the substitution of Sandman as the named plaintiff.
In Sandman v. McGrath, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 800 (2011), the Massachusetts Appeals Court noted that judicial estoppel "is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding that is contary to a position it had previously asserted in another proceeding." The court held that the doctrine must be applied to the real party in interest.
The court held that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Hanlon from bringing claims reqardng the adequacy of preparation for and actions at trial, because in the underlying action he had successfully argued that the damages award was not exessive.
The court held that the doctrine does not apply to claims regarding failure to pursue settlement opportunities. Hanlon's claim that he would have settled the underlying lawsuit is not inconsistent with the argument that Sandman was negligent and liable to him for damages.
At trial Hanlon received a judgment of approximately $17 million.
Hanlon, as the assignee of Sandman's rights, then sued Sandman's insurer, Homeland, for breach of its duty to defend and breach of Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 93A and 176D. He alleged that the insurer and the insurance defense attorney failed to adequately prepare for and defend at trial, exposing Sandman to an excess judgment; and that they failed to explore settlement opportunities and convey them to Sandman.
Hanlon later substituted Sandman as the plaintiff. Homeland moved to dismiss on the basis of judicial estoppel. That motion was allowed, on the ground that Hanlon was the real party in interest regardless of the substitution of Sandman as the named plaintiff.
In Sandman v. McGrath, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 800 (2011), the Massachusetts Appeals Court noted that judicial estoppel "is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding that is contary to a position it had previously asserted in another proceeding." The court held that the doctrine must be applied to the real party in interest.
The court held that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Hanlon from bringing claims reqardng the adequacy of preparation for and actions at trial, because in the underlying action he had successfully argued that the damages award was not exessive.
The court held that the doctrine does not apply to claims regarding failure to pursue settlement opportunities. Hanlon's claim that he would have settled the underlying lawsuit is not inconsistent with the argument that Sandman was negligent and liable to him for damages.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
2010's ten most significant insurance decisions
This article is both funny and informative.
As so often, thanks to Mike Tracy at Rudolph Friedmann for forwarding it to me.
As so often, thanks to Mike Tracy at Rudolph Friedmann for forwarding it to me.
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