Tom Raftery, a fantastic bankruptcy attorney who has answered many questions for me over the years, http://www.rafterylaw.com/, wondered whether he should sign the loss/damage waiver when he rents a car, or pay the extra charge for insurance. I too always have that concern before I hope for the best and initial the waiver at the car rental counter.
Judy Bearfield at DeGuglielmo Insurance Agency in Medford (my own insurance agent, who I highly recommend) told me that the standard Massachusetts auto policy covers rental cars in the United States and Canada. Other countries, including Mexico, are not covered.
I confirmed this by reviewing the current standard Massachusetts Auto Policy ("the Seventh edition" for those in the know). The optional collision coverage provides coverage for "collision damage to other private passenger autos while being used by you or a household member with the consent of the owner." This would include rental cars.
So the bottom line is that your auto policy provides collision coverage on a rental car to the same extent as it does on your own car. Keep in mind that collision coverage is optional; if you have a low-value car you may not have purchased it. In addition, the rental car company may argue that it suffered damages (for example, loss of the rental value of the car while it is being repaired) that may not be covered by the collision coverage of your policy.
Following up on Judy Bearfield's comment that rental cars are covered only in the United States and Canada, the "Where You Are Covered Provision" of the auto policy states that the Compulsory Bodily Injuries To Others (providing $20,000 in coverage if you injure someone else in a car accident) applies only to accidents in Massachusetts. All other coverages apply only to accidents in the United States or Canada.
I should add that with the recent deregulation of auto policies in Massachusetts, as of April 1, 2008 each auto insurer can file its own endorsements that change the optional portions of the policy.
Finally, some credit card companies provide coverage for rental cars--but, given the constant changes to credit card terms, even if you think your card provides coverage you should double check, and ask closely about the terms.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Change In Citation Rule Can Have A Big Impact
An issue that comes up frequently in construction defect litigation is whether a contractor's General Liability policy provides coverage for damages to the building itself caused by the contractor's faulty construction. Many such cases have to do with weatherproofing: for example, if a building's windows are not weathertight because the contractors made a mistake, will their insurance cover the cost of repair?
I have been personally involved in several such cases, bringing one to the United States Court of Appeals. (B & T Masonry Constr. Co., Inc. v. Public Serv. Mut., Inc., 382 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 2004).) The issue has always been whether approximately six exclusions apply, separately or together, to exclude all or some of the damages. The analysis can never be a quick one because each exclusion has to be analyzed separately under the facts of the case. The exclusions vary in the timing of when the damages had to be discovered, where in the building the damages were, whether the work was done by the insured or a subcontractor, and other factors. The exclusions overlap but don't always exclude all damages.
If a new citation rule announced in February by the Massachusetts Appeals Court had been in effect just a few months earlier, though, the entire exclusion analysis would arguably be unnecessary. The Massachusetts Appeals Court has stated in at least two unpublished Rule 1:28 decisions that a construction defect is not an occurrence. Mello Constr. Inc. v. Acadaia Ins., 70 Mass. Ap. Ct. 1004 (2007); Davenport v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2002).
Rule 1:28 is a rule of the Appeals Court that allows a panel of Appeals Court judges to decide a case without circulating it to all the judges on the court. The theory is that such cases are so clear-cut that additional work by the court is unnecessary. Until February, citation to Rule 1:28 decisions was prohibited by the Appeals Court.
In a footnote in Chace v. Curran, the Appeals Court announced that Rule 1:28 decisions issued after February 25, 2008 "may be cited for their persuasive value but . . . not as binding precedent."
If the new rule had been in effect when Mello was issued, I would be much more likely to recommend that an insurer deny coverage outright based on the theory that a construction defect is not an occurrence, rather than relying on exclusions which, after a long analysis, may not exclude all damages.
So, although citation rules may seem picayune, they have far-reaching consequences.
I have been personally involved in several such cases, bringing one to the United States Court of Appeals. (B & T Masonry Constr. Co., Inc. v. Public Serv. Mut., Inc., 382 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 2004).) The issue has always been whether approximately six exclusions apply, separately or together, to exclude all or some of the damages. The analysis can never be a quick one because each exclusion has to be analyzed separately under the facts of the case. The exclusions vary in the timing of when the damages had to be discovered, where in the building the damages were, whether the work was done by the insured or a subcontractor, and other factors. The exclusions overlap but don't always exclude all damages.
If a new citation rule announced in February by the Massachusetts Appeals Court had been in effect just a few months earlier, though, the entire exclusion analysis would arguably be unnecessary. The Massachusetts Appeals Court has stated in at least two unpublished Rule 1:28 decisions that a construction defect is not an occurrence. Mello Constr. Inc. v. Acadaia Ins., 70 Mass. Ap. Ct. 1004 (2007); Davenport v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2002).
Rule 1:28 is a rule of the Appeals Court that allows a panel of Appeals Court judges to decide a case without circulating it to all the judges on the court. The theory is that such cases are so clear-cut that additional work by the court is unnecessary. Until February, citation to Rule 1:28 decisions was prohibited by the Appeals Court.
In a footnote in Chace v. Curran, the Appeals Court announced that Rule 1:28 decisions issued after February 25, 2008 "may be cited for their persuasive value but . . . not as binding precedent."
If the new rule had been in effect when Mello was issued, I would be much more likely to recommend that an insurer deny coverage outright based on the theory that a construction defect is not an occurrence, rather than relying on exclusions which, after a long analysis, may not exclude all damages.
So, although citation rules may seem picayune, they have far-reaching consequences.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
New SJC Decision Holds Medpay Provides Coverage Before Health Insurance
Mike Tracy at Rudolph Friedman, http://www.rflawyers.com/, has forwarded to me a decision handed down on May 12, 2008 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, upholding a clause of a health insurance contract that requires Medpay to be exhausted before the health insurer is required to pay. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mass., Inc. (I should note that Mike, who is on top of everything relating to insurance coverage issues, actually forwarded this decision to me on the 12th.)
MedPay is an optional coverage of motor vehicle insurance. It is not part of the PIP scheme, but provides medical coverage to an insured after PIP payments have been exhausted. I haven't run into MedPay issues very often. I think the main reason is that most people who have health insurance don't bother to purchase it, even though it can cover health insurance copayments or other gaps in medical insurance coverage. People who don't have health insurance, I imagine, tend not to purchase any optional coverages as they raise the price of their auto insurance.
In Metropolitan, Rice was injured in a motor vehicle accident. He had PIP and Medpay coverage under a Metropolitan auto policy and had health insurance with Blue Cross. Met paid the first $2,000 of his medical bills under PIP coverage. Rice submitted the remaining bills to Blue Cross.
Blue Cross denied coverage on the grounds that its subscriber certificate stated, "Unless required by law, coverage under this contract will be secondary when another plan [defined elsewhere to include MedPay coverage] provides you with coverage for health care services." Metropolitan brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to provide medical benefits to Rice after his PIP coverage was exhausted.
The SJC noted that by statute a health insurer may not deny coverage because of the existence of PIP benefits, but that no statute prohibits a health insurer from denying coverage because of the existence of MedPay benefits.
The SJC rejected Met's argument that if health insurance would not cover the additional medical bills, Met would cover it under PIP, not MedPay. The SJC stated that such an action would be illogical and contrary to the intent of the PIP statute of keeping the costs of compulsory PIP insurance low. The SJC went further and stated that when a health insurer denies coverage because of the existence of MedPay benefits, the motor vehicle insurer must cover those medical costs under MedPay, not PIP.
MedPay is an optional coverage of motor vehicle insurance. It is not part of the PIP scheme, but provides medical coverage to an insured after PIP payments have been exhausted. I haven't run into MedPay issues very often. I think the main reason is that most people who have health insurance don't bother to purchase it, even though it can cover health insurance copayments or other gaps in medical insurance coverage. People who don't have health insurance, I imagine, tend not to purchase any optional coverages as they raise the price of their auto insurance.
In Metropolitan, Rice was injured in a motor vehicle accident. He had PIP and Medpay coverage under a Metropolitan auto policy and had health insurance with Blue Cross. Met paid the first $2,000 of his medical bills under PIP coverage. Rice submitted the remaining bills to Blue Cross.
Blue Cross denied coverage on the grounds that its subscriber certificate stated, "Unless required by law, coverage under this contract will be secondary when another plan [defined elsewhere to include MedPay coverage] provides you with coverage for health care services." Metropolitan brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to provide medical benefits to Rice after his PIP coverage was exhausted.
The SJC noted that by statute a health insurer may not deny coverage because of the existence of PIP benefits, but that no statute prohibits a health insurer from denying coverage because of the existence of MedPay benefits.
The SJC rejected Met's argument that if health insurance would not cover the additional medical bills, Met would cover it under PIP, not MedPay. The SJC stated that such an action would be illogical and contrary to the intent of the PIP statute of keeping the costs of compulsory PIP insurance low. The SJC went further and stated that when a health insurer denies coverage because of the existence of MedPay benefits, the motor vehicle insurer must cover those medical costs under MedPay, not PIP.
Thursday, May 8, 2008
A thumbnail sketch of PIP
In theory, PIP, or Personal Injury Protection, is a simple concept. It is Massachusetts' version of no-fault automobile insurance. Every insured driver's own insurance company will cover up to $2,000 in medical bills for that driver if he or she is in an motor vehicle accident, regardless of whose fault the accident is. If the driver doesn't have medical insurance, PIP will cover up to $8,000 in medical expenses. PIP can also cover lost wages and other expenses.
The counterpart to PIP is the "tort threshold", under which someone who has been injured in an automobile accident cannot bring a lawsuit against the other driver unless the injured person's medical bills exceed $2,000. If the person goes to trial and wins, the verdict will be reduced by the amount that was paid in PIP. That 's called the "PIP setoff."
There is also a scheme by which insurance companies reimburse each other for PIP payments, so that the insurer of the negligent party ultimately ends up paying. If X and Y are both injured in an accident and their respective insurers pay each of their medical bills through PIP, the insurers will decide who is at fault. If the insurers can't agree on who is at fault they will arbitrate the issue. If they decide, on their own or through arbitration, that X is at fault, X's insurer will reimburse Y's insurer the amount that Y's insurer paid on Y's behalf in PIP.
That's PIP in nutshell. In a future post I'll discuss what lawyers call "the PIP morass" (the complicated issues in this seemingly simple statute) and the related issue of why many top-notch personal injury attorneys can't answer seemingly basic questions about PIP.
The counterpart to PIP is the "tort threshold", under which someone who has been injured in an automobile accident cannot bring a lawsuit against the other driver unless the injured person's medical bills exceed $2,000. If the person goes to trial and wins, the verdict will be reduced by the amount that was paid in PIP. That 's called the "PIP setoff."
There is also a scheme by which insurance companies reimburse each other for PIP payments, so that the insurer of the negligent party ultimately ends up paying. If X and Y are both injured in an accident and their respective insurers pay each of their medical bills through PIP, the insurers will decide who is at fault. If the insurers can't agree on who is at fault they will arbitrate the issue. If they decide, on their own or through arbitration, that X is at fault, X's insurer will reimburse Y's insurer the amount that Y's insurer paid on Y's behalf in PIP.
That's PIP in nutshell. In a future post I'll discuss what lawyers call "the PIP morass" (the complicated issues in this seemingly simple statute) and the related issue of why many top-notch personal injury attorneys can't answer seemingly basic questions about PIP.
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